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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF I J IAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO : Case No. 20040965-CA 
Defendai it/ Appellai it ' : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Paul Anthony Armijo ("Mr. Armijo" or "Appellant") appeals 
from, a judgment of conviction for Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Si lbstance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), entered by 
the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction over criminal convictions other than first degree felonies. Utah 
Code/Vnn § 7K-2a-3(c) (2(HJ !i A o»|n nl thejudgmeni is in \ildeiuluni V, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the officers' violation of the "knock and announce" rule which 
forms part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment constituted an 
illegal searcl 1 w 1 lei i. the officers failed to \ v ait a i easonable amoi int. of tit i le before 
entering the residence by force? 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard is bifurcated. "The factual findings 
of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Salt Lake Citv v.Rav. 2000 UT App 55, ^ 8, 998 P.2d 274. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness where this Court accords no deference to 
the trial court's determination of the law in search and seizure cases. See State v. Brake. 
2004 UT 95,115, 103P.3d699.. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 59-66; 84-92; 104-09; 126-
133; 201; 202; 203. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statute and constitutional provisions are in 
Addendum B: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-210 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Armijo was charged with disarming a peace officer, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (2003); unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002); four counts of assault on a peace officer, class A 
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4; and unlawful possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. 
R. 3-6, 11-18. At the preliminary hearing on February 17, 2004, the trial court found 
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sufficient evidence to bind Mr. Armijo over on all the charges except the unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia which was dismissed. R. 35-36; 200:46. Mr. Armijo 
entered not guilt} pleas on tl IC i en laii in lg charges. R 35-36; 2130:46. 
On March 26, 2004, Mr. Armijo filed a motion to suppress the illegally obtained 
evidence. R. 59-66. On May 18, 2004, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the motion to suppress. R. 84-92, On June 11, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing on Mr \ rn lijo's motioi l to si lppress. R 10 :1 05; 201 ' I he trial con lr I: set tl ic 
hearing over until June 15, 2004 for the purpose of arguments. R. 201:22; 202. On June 
15, 2004, the trial court took the matter under advisement. R. 202:13-15. On June 17, 
2004, the trial court issued its ruling denying Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress. R. 108-
09; 2UJ • • -.. v 12, 2004, the ti ial coi it I: entered its Findings of Fact, Coi ich isions of 
Law and Order denying the motion to suppress. R. 121-125. A copy of the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
is in Addendum C. 
On Ji il) 19, 2004, I\ li: \ rmi jo ei iter ed into a coi iditioi ial guilt} plea pursuant to 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), wherein he pled guilty to one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, R 126-133. Mr. 
Armijo and the State specifically agreed that Mr. Armijo entered into this plea "while 
reserving his right to appeal tl i.e denial of 1 lis n lotiot i to suppress "1 R 130 Oi i 
November 1, 2004, Mr. Armijo was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years in 
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prison. R. 168. The trial court suspended the prison term and sentenced Mr. Armijo to a 
term of 365 days in jail with no credit for time served. R. 169. Mr. Armijo filed a timely 
notice of appeal. R. 172-73. On December 8, 2004, the trial court granted Mr. Armijo's 
motion to stay sentence pending appeal. R. 197-98. Mr. Armijo was released from jail 
on a $5,000 bond to the supervision of pretrial services. 198-99. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 2, 2003, Officer Jason B. Watkin, Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office, obtained a warrant to search a residence located at 2843 South 8700 West, 
Magna, in Salt Lake County. R. 216-226. The sheriffs office was investigating possible 
drug activity at the residence. R. 216-222. The search warrant authorized the search of 
"all persons who are in the address sought... at the time of the Warrant" for "narcotics 
and paraphernalia hidden on their person." R. 216, 224 In requesting the warrant, the 
officer did not request the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant. R. 216-226 Accordingly, 
the sheriffs office requested and obtained a "knock-and-announce" warrant which 
required them to alert the occupants as to their identity and purpose and wait a reasonable 
time before entering the residence. R. 224-26. 
Thirty to forty-five minutes before sunrise, on December 4, 2003, Sergeant 
Mathews,1 Detectives Brent Jex and Mike Ikemiyashiro and Officer Watkins, together 
^ h e trial transcripts spelled Sergeant Mathews' name as "Matthews." However, 
the trial court in its findings spelled it "Mathews." For consistency, Appellant spells the 
sergeant's name in accordance with the trial court. 
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with eight other SWAT team members, served the warrant. R. 200:7; 201:6, 11, 15, 17. 
Sergeant Mathews was in charge of the operation and in the lead team. R. 201:17-18. 
Officer Watkins and Detective Ikei ni> ashiro were also part of the lead team going into 
the residence first while Detective Jex brought 13, 17. The 
SWAT team members were dressed in raid gear consisting of a black police tactical 
uniform complete with weapons and "Police" printed in gold on the sleeves and on the 
back and front of ? , ,:•: * he team was also wearing helmets, 
load-bearing vests witn punt -= **.ls across *: • : .«u» IJJLVN,M,! 
thigh holsters. R. 200:6-7; 201:7. 
When the SWAT team was about one house to the north of the target residence, a 
vehicle approached from the south. R. 200:8-9; 201:7. According to Detective Jex and 
Officer Watkins, the vehicle appeared in linn Inwaid tht iltnvwn nf the residencr but 
did not actually pull into the driveway. R. 201:8, 14, 17. Instead, it started to pull up to 
it, then stopped, backed up and continued on down the street. R. 201:14, 17. As the 
vehicle tinned towards the driveway, its headlights hit the SWAT team as they were 
coming up the sidewalk. R. 201:8, 1*4, , ] "tV* < *• •>•; ^  ••• *-m wasth u «i.. Hide 
changed directions after its headlights illuminated the team. k. ^u±. 14, 17. Detective 
Jex said that even though it was dark outside, he noticed that the passenger in the vehicle 
was on a phone R. 201:8. Detective Jex tried to get the license plate of the car and 
communicated what he saw. u:s, u . Sergeant Mall lews tl len. called oi itM Wt are 
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burned. We are burned. Execute." R. 201:8, 12, 17. At some point, Mathews told 
Ikemiyashiro "that there was light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Mathews 
told Watkins later that night he had seen a light come on in the basement of the residence 
after the vehicle had taken off. R. 201:19, 22.2 None of the other SWAT team members 
testified that they saw a light come on in the house. R. 200:19, 20; 201:12, 18-19. Nor 
did any officer testify that he saw any type of movement in the house or heard any 
phones ringing or other sounds. R. 200:20; 201:15; 202:8-9. 
When Sergeant Mathews called the "burn," the team was approximately 25 feet 
away from the target house and move rapidly to execute the warrant. R. 201:9, 13, 17. 
According to Officer Watkins, Sergeant Mathews "knocked on the door, very loudly, 
[and] started yelling out, "Sheriffs office, search warrant, and then immediately the 
breacher breached the door," and they entered the house. R. 201:18. The SWAT team 
did not wait for the door to be answered before forcing it open. R. 201:20. Instead, they 
used a battering ram and knocked the door open. R. 200:20. Detective Jex did not 
know whether the lead team knocked or announced but said that "Police, search warrant" 
was called out many times before he crossed the threshold of the residence. R. 201:9. 
Similarly, Detective Ikemiyashiro who was part of the lead team did not recall whether 
there was a knock but said there could have been. R. 200:20. Detective Ikemiyashiro 
2Sergeant Mathews was unavailable to testify so defense counsel stipulated that 
his testimony concerning the light in the basement could come in through the testimony 
of the other officers. R. 201:22. 
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thought M[t]here may have just been a breach and then an entry." R. 200:20. However, 
as soon as the door was open they started to announce "Police serving a search warrant.1' 
R. 200:21. 
After Detective Ikemiyashiro entered, he made his way toward the back of the 
home. R. 200:9. Once at the back of the home, he found a set of stairs leading down to a 
basement. R. 200:9. Detective Ikemiyashiro called out downstairs and then waited for 
support from Detective Jex. R. 200:9. When additional officers were able to assist, 
Ikemiyashiro made his way down the stairs. R. 200:9; 201:10. Ikemiyashiro and Jex 
scanned the main area and not seeing any threats went into the first open door. R. 
200:10; 201:10. The officers saw Mr. Amijo, the only person in the basement, lying on a 
mattress asleep. R. 200:10-11; 201:10. The officers yelled out "Police serving a search 
warrant" but Mr. Armijo did not awaken. R. 200:11; 201:11. Detective Ikemiyashiro 
attempted to wake Mr. Armijo but Mr. Armijo was not responding to his verbal 
commands. R. 200:11. Detective Ikemiyashiro nudged him with his foot but Mr. Armijo 
was still unresponsive. R. 200:11, 21. Once Mr. Armijo opened his eyes and appeared 
as though he was awake, Detective Ikemiyashiro continued to shout "Police, serving a 
search warrant." R. 200:12. When Mr. Armijo awoke he lunged towards the officers. 
R. 200:12. Detective Ikemiyashiro indicated in his report that after Mr. Armijo stood up 
he, "used [his] boot and kicked Mr. Armijo back down to the mattress." R. 200:22. Mr. 
Armijo resisted the officers attempts to restrain him but was eventually restrained and 
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taken to jail. R. 200:12-15. After he was taken to jail, jail officers searched Mr. Armijo 
and found a bag of methamphetamine in his pocket. R. 200:15-17. 
Mr. Armijo filed a motion to suppress the evidence which the trial court denied. 
R. 123; 203:5. The trial court stated that its decision to deny the motion to suppress was 
made by looking at the circumstances "subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the 
scene to assess the specific facts of this case." R. 123; 203:3. The Court noted however 
that it was greatly troubled by "the fact that the light supposedly came on in the 
basement, [but] the person down in the basement,.. ., was sound asleep." R. 203:5. 
However, the trial court stated that it had to look at the circumstances subjectively, 
therefore, based on its subjective analysis the trial court determined that the officers 
"would have thought that there were exigent circumstances and that they needed to go 
into the home." R. 123; 203:5. This appeal followed. R. 172-73. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement and Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-210 (2003), officers possessing a search warrant must knock and announce their 
authority before forcibly entering a residence. Only if exigent circumstances exist may 
officers dispense with this requirement. When determining whether exigent 
circumstances exist, courts are required to review the totality of the circumstances from 
an objective perspective. In this case, the trial court erroneously denied Mr. Armijo's 
motion to suppress the evidence when officers violated the knock and announce 
8 
requirement, determining that it had to look at the totality of the circumstances 
subjectively through the eyes of the officers in deciding whether there were exigent 
circumstances. An objective review of the totality of the circumstances in this case does 
not support exigent circumstances, therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BECAUSE AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT SUPPORT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
In serving search warrants, the federal constitution requires police officers to 
announce their authority and purpose and then to wait a reasonable time for a response 
before forcibly entering a residence. U.S. Const, amend. IV.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-
210 (2003). The police may only dispense with these requirements if exigent 
circumstances require immediate entry. When determining whether exigent 
circumstances existed, courts review the totality of the circumstances from an objective 
perspective. In this case, the trial court made its determination by viewing the 
circumstances "subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the 
specific facts of this case." R. 123; 203:5. Although the trial court was troubled by the 
inconsistent testimony as to whether a light came on in the basement, it nevertheless 
erred by looking at the circumstances subjectively, and making its determination from a 
subjective standpoint that "it was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent 
9 
circumstances arose, necessitating their rapid entry into the home " R. 123;203:4-5. 
The trial court's determination that exigent circumstances existed based wholly on 
the officers' subjective views rather than an objective determination based on the totality 
of the circumstances was erroneous. When viewed objectively, the officers' illegal entry 
into the residence requires suppression because it violated Mr. Armijo's fundamental 
right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. Because 
exigent circumstances did not exist justifying the officers violation of the "knock and 
announce" rule, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Armijo's motion 
to suppress. 
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Held That the Knock and Announce 
Rule Falls Within the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend IV. "The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness is to preserve that degree of respect for the 
privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision 
was adopted — even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to 
considering all sorts of intrusion reasonable." Richards v. Wisconsin. 520 U.S. 385, 392 
n.4 (1997) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
The Fourth Amendment encompasses the common law principle generally 
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requiring the police to "announce [] their presence and authority prior to entering" a 
building when serving search warrants. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). 
These requirements, known as the "knock and announce" rule, mandate that police wait 
"a reasonable period of time" before entering. State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 413 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (declining to recognize that all violations of the "knock and announce" rule 
are fundamental) abrogated by Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); see also Miller 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) ("The requirement of prior notice of authority 
and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should 
not be given grudging application."). 
In Wilson, the Supreme Court noted that while its prior case law has 
"acknowledged that the common-law principle of announcement is 'embedded in Anglo-
American law/ [it has] never squarely held that this principle is an element of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [but] now so hold." I4_ at 934 
(citations omitted). Holding that the "common law 'knock and announce9 principle 
forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment," IcL at 929, the 
Supreme Court stated that "[g]iven the longstanding common-law endorsement of the 
practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the 
factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure. IcL at 
934. 
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Utah has codified these common law "knock and announce" and "no-knock" 
principles in Utah Code Annotated section 77-23-210 (2003). Utah's search warrant 
statute states: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing 
the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he 
is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing 
the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed or, or secreted, or that physical 
harm may result to any person if notice were give. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210; see. United States v. Ramirez. 523 U.S. 65, 73 (1998) 
(determining that because the federal "knock and announce" statute codifies the common 
law "and the common law in turn informs the Fourth Amendment, [the Court's] 
decisions in Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute"). In 
codifying the common law "knock and announce" rule, Utah's statute seeks to ensure 
"(1) the protection of an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the 
prevention of violence and physical injury to both police and occupants which may result 
from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting 
from forced entry." State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988); see also 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §4.8 (a) (4th Ed. 2004). "[T]he individual interests 
implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry should not be unduly minimized." 
12 
Richards. 520 U.S. at 393. 
With the holdings of Wilson and Richards, the United States Supreme Court has 
clarified that a violation of the flknock-and-announce,f rule is a fundamental violation of 
a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934; Richards, 520 
U.S. at 393. The Supreme Court's ruling on the question abrogates this Court's holding 
in State v. Ribe. 876 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), which declined to adopt a per se 
rule that all violations of the "knock and announce" rule constituted a "fundamental" 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, since Wilson, this Court has recognized that 
"[t]he 'knock and announce' rule . . . safeguards Fourth Amendment rights, [by] 
protecting citizens from violations through the misconduct of police officers." State v. 
Zesigner, 2003 UT App 37, ^ |12, 65 P.3d 314 (citations omitted). 
Because the "knock and announce rule" falls within the fundamental right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, violation of the rule requires suppression. 
See State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992) (determining suppression appropriate 
remedy for violations of fundamental rights); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 
1988) (same). Therefore, when officers in this case violated the "knock and announce" 
rule by forcing entry into the residence without waiting a reasonable time, they violated 
Mr. Armijo's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable seraches under the Fourth 
Amendment. This fundamental violation required the trial court to grant Mr. Armijo's 
motion to suppress the evidence. 
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B. An Exigent Circumstances Analysis Requires the Trial Court To Make An 
Objective Determination Based on the Totality Of the Circumstances. 
Although the knock and announce rule falls within the Constitution's 
reasonableness requirement for searches, that principle "was never stated as an inflexible 
rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. The 
obligation to announce and wait "gives way when officers 'have a reasonable suspicion 
that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would 
be dangerous or futile, or would . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for 
example, the destruction of evidence.'" United States v. Banks. 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) 
j 
(quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394 (holding blanket exception to the knock-and-
announce requirement for felony drug investigations unconstitutional)); see also State v. 
White. 851 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("trial court reviews the no-knock 
authorization for reasonableness."); State v. Rosenbaum, 845 P.2d 962, 966 n.2 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) ("criteria for issuance of no-knock searches . . . is less stringent than that 
required for the initial probable cause determination."). 
However, a reasonable suspicion requires the police officer "to point to 'specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.5" Sery, 758 P.2d at 940 (quoting Tern v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). "Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . ." 
Sery, 758 P.2d at 941 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). In Utah, magistrates may issue 
14 
a no-knock warrant if the police can show beforehand that similar circumstances exist. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2) (no-knocks issued nupon proof, [and] under oath, that 
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed . . . or that physical harm may result. . . 
if notice were given.11). The task of determining whether a given police entry is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is left to the lower courts. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 
936. 
When determining whether a police entry was reasonable because exigent 
circumstances existed, the trial courts are required to look objectively at the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the entry. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 36; State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). While an "officer's subjective belief may nevertheless be 
factored into the objective analysis,... it is never alone determinative." State v. Warren, 
2003 UT 36, ^[1, 78 P.3d 590. Exigent circumstances are defined "as those that would 
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical 
harm to the officers or other person, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of 
the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts." City of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Richards, 520 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he 
knock-and-announce requirement could give way 'under circumstances presenting a 
threat of physical violence,' or 'where police officers have reason to believe that 
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.'" (citation omitted)). 
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However, "exigency does not evolve from one individual fact. Instead, there is often a 
mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
It has been emphasized by Utah's appellate courts that an exigent circumstances analysis 
always "requires an objective determination; that is, while exigent circumstances have 
multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be 
examined in the light of the facts known to the officers at the time they acted." Henrie. 
868 P.2d at 1391 (citations and quotations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court erred in determining that even though it was troubled 
by Sergeant Mathews' claim that a light came on in the basement in relation to the 
vehicle that pulled away from the residence, it had to look subjectively at the 
circumstances to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. Trial counsel argued 
that the court should find that a light in fact did not come on in the basement because the 
claim lacked evidentiary support given that only the sergeant claimed to see a light out of 
the twelve SWAT team members present at the scene. R. 202:9, 12. The trial court then 
made the following ruling: 
You know, the court has struggled with this for a while. And a lot of it has 
to do with the testimony I've heard and the case law that's been presented. 
But based on what's in front of me, and based on the court's review of the 
evidence that was presented, I'm going to deny the defense's motion. It 
was a tough decision. But I think the Court has to make a decision, a 
subjective decision, or look at it subjectively as the peace officers looked at 
i t . . . in this particular situation. 
What you've asked me to do, [defense counsel], I can't do, and that's 
basically comes down to ignoring what the testimony would have been of 
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Sergeant... Mathews. In regards to the light coming on. I think that the 
officers had a good reason to believe that they were burned under these 
circumstances. The evidence showing that as they were getting ready to 
approach the house, and were basically at the driveway of the house that 
they were going to search, that they had the knock and announce search 
warrant for, the testimony I've heard was that the car pulled into the 
driveway, or started to pull into that driveway, that the lights illuminated, 
all of the officers. I have at least three officers that have testified here, that 
they saw what appeared to be the individual in the vehicle on a cell phone. 
They then received, over their ear pieces, the notice from Sergeant 
Mathews that a light had gone on in the house and that the, they were 
burned, meaning that they were discovered. 
I think again, I have to look at that as subjectively as the officers would 
look at it. I think at that point they would have felt that there were exigent 
circumstances that one, the, or that the people in the house had been 
notified; two, that the evidence could have destroyed; and three, that their 
safety was at risk. 
I think it's a really close call . . . . 
I don't think that this court is in the position to say that the police did not think 
that their lives were in danger or that there were exigent circumstances under the 
facts that I heard . . . . 
What troubled me the most was the fact that the light supposedly came on in the 
basement, the person in the basement, they say, was sound asleep. In fact, 
they had trouble waking him up. It does trouble me. It troubles me greatly. 
But again, I think I'd have to look at it subjectively as they would have 
seen it under that situation. And I think this court, at least, can make a 
determination that they would have thought that there were exigent 
circumstances and that they needed to go into the home. 
R. 203:3-5 (emphasis added). 
The trial court found in its written findings of fact, that n[s]everal detectives 
testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews said that as the vehicle drove 
off he observed a light come on in the basement " R. 122 (emphasis added). The 
17 
trial court never affirmatively found that a light actually came on in the basement, simply 
that this sergeant "said" that he saw a light come on in the basement. The trial court then 
went on to erroneously apply the wrong standard to the totality of the circumstances 
concluding "[t]o determine if exigent circumstances existed in this case, the Court looked 
subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific facts of 
this case." R. 123. Appellant, does not dispute that Sergeant Mathews "said" he saw a 
light come on in the basement but instead disputes that when viewed objectively the 
weight of the evidence supports that a light actually came on. 
The evidence regarding the light in the basement consisted of the following: 
Detective Ikemiyashiro was told by Sergeant Mathews, who was in charge of the 
operation, "that there was light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Detective 
Ikemiyashiro does not clarify at what point Sergeant Mathews told him "that there was 
light and movement from the home." R. 200:19. Detective Ikemiyashiro did not actually 
see a light on in the basement himself. R. 200:19. It is not clear whether Sergeant 
Mathews communicated his concern about a light allegedly being on in the basement to 
any of the officers prior to calling the "burn." R. 200:8, 19-20. However, according to 
the testimonies of Detective Jex and Officer Watkins the only communication heard prior 
to forcefully entering the residence was Sergeant Mathews stating "We are burned, We 
are burned. Execute." R. 201:12, 17. In fact, Detective Jex had never heard anything 
"about any lights or anything like that." R. 201:12. 
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Similarly, Officer Watkins was not aware of Sergeant Mathews seeing a light 
come on in the basement until sometime after entry into the residence. R. 201:19. 
Detective Jex and Officer Watkins both testified that they did not see a light on in the 
basement in relation to the vehicle in front of the residence. R. 201:12, 17-19. While 
Detective Jex believed he may not have seen a light because his attention was focused on 
getting the vehicle's license plate number, and Officer Watkins may not have seen the 
light because his attention was focused on the front of the house, it does not explain why 
none of the other officers also did not see a light. R. 201:12, 17-19. Furthermore, no 
evidence was presented that any of the twelve officers heard any noise such as a phone 
ringing or movement of any type coming from the house. R. 200:20; 201:15. 
Based on the evidence presented by the State, the trial court realized the 
probability of the sergeant actually seeing a light come on in the basement was belied by 
the officers' testimony that when they searched the basement the only person down there 
was Mr. Armijo who was asleep and extremely difficult to wake up. R. 203:5 The trial 
court was troubled by the sergeant's claim regarding the light even stating that "the light 
supposedly came on in the basement." R. 203:5. However, the trial court denied Mr. 
Armijo's motion to suppress because it believed that it had to look at the circumstances 
subjectively to make a determination regarding exigency. R. 203. Given the trial court's 
concerns regarding the sergeant's testimony, had the court applied the correct objective 
standard analysis it would have determined that a light had not come on in the basement. 
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The remaining circumstances, when looked at objectively, did not rise to the level of 
exigency necessitating the officers forced entry into the home. 
The objective factors in this case consisted of the following: The SWAT team 
members were about a house away from the residence when an unknown vehicle 
approached from the south. R. 200:8-9; 201:7. The vehicle turned towards the driveway 
of the target residence but did not pull into the driveway. R. 201:8, 14, 17. Instead, the 
vehicle pull up to the curb, stopped, backed up and continued on down the street. R. 
201:14, 17. As the vehicle was turning towards the driveway, its headlights hit the 
SWAT team as they were coming up the sidewalk. R. 201:8, 14, 17. The officers' 
subjective impression was that the vehicle changed directions after its headlights 
illuminated the team. R. 201:14, 17. Detective Jex noticed that the passenger in the 
vehicle was on a phone. R. 201:8. Detective Ikemiyashiro also thought "it looked like 
someone might have been on the phone in that vehicle." R. 200:9. However, Detective 
Jex testified that the passenger was already on the phone when he first observed him. R. 
201:15. Detective Jex then communicated to the other officers that the passenger was on 
the phone. R. 201:8. Detective Jex did not know to whom the passenger was on the 
phone and did not hear any phones ringing from inside the house when he approached. 
R. 201:15. Detective Ikemiyashiro who was one of the first ones to approach the 
residence also testified that he did not hear anything coming from inside the house. R. 
200:20. 
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The totality of these circumstances, considered objectively, do not support exigent 
circumstances necessitating a forced entry either for the protection of the officers or to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. See. Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388; Richards, 520 U.S. 
at 391. Although the officers may have believed the vehicle continued on its way after 
seeing them, that is not enough to create exigent circumstances as to what is occurring 
inside the target residence. Even though Detective Jex noticed that the vehicle's 
passenger was on the phone, he did not know to whom this individual was talking. In 
fact, Detective Jex testified that the passenger was on the phone when he first saw him, 
not that he made the call after seeing the officers. R. 201:15. Other than Sergeant 
Mathews' lone claim that a light came on in relation to the vehicle's presence, none of 
the other officers testified that they were concerned that this passenger was alerting the 
residents of their presence. The officers testified that they simply believed that the 
vehicle changed direction after seeing the officers. R. 201:14, 17. Therefore, under an 
objective analysis, the totality of these factors weighs against a finding of exigent 
circumstances. 
Even if Sergeant Mathews' lone claim regarding the light is considered among the 
factors, it was still not enough to create exigent circumstances. When obtaining the 
search warrant, Officer Watkins sought and received a "knock and announce" warrant. 
R. 216-226. Though the officer believed that controlled substances and firearms would 
be found at the residence, he did not seek a "no-knock" warrant. R. 216-226; Ribe „ 876 
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P.2d at 413 n.27 ("If the police had fears concerning safety of the destruction of evidence 
before undertaking the search, they would presumably have sought a no-knock 
warrant."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2) (no-knocks issued "upon proof, [and] under 
oath, that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed . . . or that physical harm may 
result.. . if notice were given."). 
Instead, the officer sought a "knock and announce" warrant to "be issued for the 
seizure of said items at any time day or night" to prevent the possibility of the items 
"being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason . . . " R. 222. 
The "other good reason" articulated by the officer for the issuance of a search warrant 
which allowed a nighttime search consisted of the following: 
The cover of darkness would enhance an undetected approach to the 
residence without endangering the safety of police officers or innocent 
uninvolved parties. It also aids in defeating counter surveillance 
techniques used by illegal narcotic distributors. The cover of darkness 
would enhance the ability to approach and enter the residence while 
reducing the possibility to retrieve a weapon or arm any explosive device or 
trap to defeat law enforcement. Furthermore the address sought to be 
searched on this Warrant/Affidavit is located in a residential neighborhood. 
Service of the search warrant during the hours of darkness will insure the 
safety of neighbors, occupant of the address sought to be searched, and 
other involved parties due to their presence in the area being limited during 
those hours. 
R. 222. 
Hence, even though the officer's belief was that if the residents were made aware 
of the officers approach it would enable the residents to "conceal[]" or "destroy []" 
evidence or allow for "the possibility to retrieve a weapon," the officer still sought a 
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"knock and announce" warrant. R. 222. Yet the very purpose of a "knock and 
announce" warrant is to give the residents notice of the police officers presence and 
authority and allow them an opportunity to comply. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 
(1) (statute requires officers to give notice of their authority and purpose and wait for a 
reasonable amount of time for admittance). "As [the Supreme Court] observed in 
Wilson, the common law recognized that individuals should have an opportunity to 
themselves comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a 
forcible entry. These interests are not inconsequential." Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5; 
Banks, 540 U.S. at 41 ("One point in making an officer knock and announce,..., is to 
give a person inside the chance to save his door."). Otherwise, "when police enter a 
residence without announcing their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity 
to prepare themselves for such an entry." Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5. As the Supreme 
Court recognized, the argument "that. . . most search warrants are executed during the 
late night and early morning hours" does not excuse officers from complying the 
requirements of a "knock and announce" warrant. IdL. "The brief interlude between 
announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to 
pull on clothes or get out of bed." Id. 
Furthermore, officers cannot create their own exigency because of their subjective 
belief that their preferred method of approaching the residence may have been negated by 
a passing vehicle. As stated above, the purpose of a "knock and announce" warrant is to 
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give the residents notice and time to comply. See supra. A light on in the basement does 
not impart any more information about what is occurring in the residence than the 
officers' knew before obtaining the warrant. The officers' belief or knowledge about the 
destructibility of evidence and possibility of weapons remained the same. Although 
officers sought to conceal their approach with the "cover of darkness1' to "enhance an 
undetected approach," a light coming on in the basement did not suddenly eliminate the 
mandated requirement for the officers to give notice of their authority and purpose and 
wait a reasonable time for a response. 
Upon approach of the residence, the officers did not hear any noises suggesting 
the destruction of evidence. No other officer testified that they saw a light come on as 
they approached the home or even heard of its possibility until after the execution of the 
warrant. In fact, the record does not support that any of the officers were especially 
concerned with either their safety or the destruction of evidence stemming from the 
alleged light on in the basement. Despite the presence of at least twelve SWAT officers, 
no testimony was offered indicating any urgency that some of the officers move quickly 
to secure the basement given the possibility that the light indicated that evidence was 
being destroyed or that the residents were arming themselves. Rather, the testimony of 
Detective Ikemiyashiro indicates that the officers did not have any immediate concerns 
with the happenings that might be occurring in the basement above those in the rest of 
the residence. Instead, Detective Ikemiyashiro testified that "[o]nce [he] got to the back 
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of the home, [he] found a set of stairs . . . that led down to a basement." R. 200:9. He 
"called out downstairs" and then "waited for support." R. 200:9. "Then once additional 
officers were able to assist" him he made his way downstairs to the basement. R. 200:9-
10. 
In sum, an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstance in this case shows 
that a light did not come on in the basement and the remaining factor of a vehicle 
changing directions upon seeing at least twelve SWAT officers coming down the street 
does not support exigent circumstances. However, even if the light is considered among 
the factors it did not create exigent circumstances. The very purpose of a "knock and 
announce" warrant is to provide notice to the residence of the officers presence and 
authority and give them an opportunity to comply. Furthermore, the evidence presented 
by the state does not indicate that the officers had any exigency concerns about what 
might possibly be happening in the basement. Therefore, at most, a light on in the 
basement would signify to the officers that they might have to wait a little longer once 
they knock and announce their presence for someone to answer the door. 
Because the officers violated the "knock and announce" rule by forcing their way 
into the residence without waiting a reasonable amount of time in absence of exigent 
circumstances, suppression of the evidence is required. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Armijo, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this AJ*day of April, 2005. 
/ 
-^Y , A 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
Hle rig|1^ 0 | j j ^ pe 0p|e LU foe s e c u n ||j y l e l r persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When no-
tice of authority is required as a prerequisite* 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or 
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
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Case No. 031908515 FS 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
THF A BOVF ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFCJPI ,j <-* — .r-:._ nj 
determinuiiiMi. • mc Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidau t. on Junel L * 5. aiv 
by Byron F. Burmester, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based upon the 
folinioity H*f k;lQ ip'cs BtTii* lr* itiJl l,i«,un \\ .itkins, and the Preliminary Hearing 
testimony of Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro, and Sergeant Mathews, memoranda, and the 
ar^unu'iits pieM-nk' mnsel, and for good cause shown, the Court, now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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2. The search warrant provided for a knock and announce search during day or 
nighttime hours. 
3. The officers were dressed in helmets, vests, and clearly marked uniforms. 
4. As the officers approached the residence, just before sunrise, an unknown 
vehicle began to turn into Defendant's driveway, and in doing so, its 
headlights illuminated the officers approaching the home. 
5. After illuminating the officers, the car quickly drove back out onto the street 
and continued past the officers. 
6. At that time, Detective Jex observed a passenger in the car talking on a cell 
phone as the vehicle reversed and left the premises. 
7. Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews, 
said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement 
of Defendant's home. 
8. Sergeant Mathews communicated to the team, based on all of the 
observations, that he thought they had been "burned" and their search was 
compromised. 
9. The officers were one residence away when the car noticed them, and they 
took approximately another 10 seconds to reach the porch of the house. 
10. Based on this assessment, the officers continued to approach Defendant's 
residence, but abandoned the knock and announce protocol, and knocked 
whiling forcing entry into the home and announcing their presence and 
purpose. 
I N C L U S I O N S OF LAW 
1. Police officers r • s- • k and annoi tiic: e pi oce cii u: es if exigent 
circumstances warrant a reasonable concern, that: (1) evidence will be 
desti oyed. 01 (2) the officers' ' safety (oi the safety of another) is at risk, 
.; To determine nV\ »oeni cimimstances existed in this case, the Court looked 
subjectively thiuub , , the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific 
facts of this case. 
3 Based on the vehicle illuminating the officers as they approached the home; 
phone, and the officer's tesiimom ihai Serjeant Mathews's saw a light come 
>n ill lllit" basemen! altcj the velnek Icll the drivc\va>, the Court concludes it 
was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent circumstances arose, 
necessitating their rapid entry into the home- for fear of destruction of evidence 
and the saielv . •* rn, ••;. 
Based upon the evidence offered by the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the 
;ii]»[ H id nig ntetiNHiimd.t lln: t mill d e m o tin.' Nelcndan' s Motion to Suppress E \ idence. 
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Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADTl TDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
2. A hearing is set for July 12, 2004, at 8:30 a.m. 
DATED this /£ day of-Jane, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. iJejihtsMfFuchs"" 1 
District, Court Judge 
